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I. INTRODUCTION
The First Restatement of Property provides that "'property'...
denote[s] legal relations between persons with respect to a thing."' The
"thing" considered in this article is the subsurface of real property, and
the legal relationship involved is the extent to which persons may deal
with invasions of their right to exclusive possession of the subsurface.
While the right to exclude trespassers is a fundamental incident of
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"Trespass": A Man's Subsurface is Not His Castle, 49 WASHBURN L.J. 247 (2010). Professor
Anderson thanks Jay Albert, University of Oklahoma Class of 2010 for his editorial and research
assistance and Professor Katheleen Guzman, University of Oklahoma College of Law, for her
insightful comments on an earlier draft.
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property ownership, 2 this right, like other incidents, neither is nor should
be absolute. The precise focus of this article, however, is to consider how
courts have treated subsurface invasions and to argue that the Second
Restatement of Torts, which states that any subsurface intrusion is
actionable,3 should be revised.4 The right to exclude trespasserss from the
subsurface of real property should be much more limited: subsurface
trespass should not be actionable whenever the trespasser's subsurface
intrusion accomplishes an important societal need (including private
commercial needs) if the subsurface owner suffers no actual and
substantial harm. And because courts have largely refused to find
harmless deep subsurface invasions actionable, the ALI should consider
whether the Second Restatement of Torts, which essentially embraces
Lord Coke's ad coelum doctrine,6 accurately reflects the trend of
subsurface trespass case law.
In the oil and gas arena, technological advancements in deep
subsurface horizontal drilling and reservoir stimulation techniques that
may encroach upon another's subsurface, once as inconceivable as
airplanes encroaching upon another's airspace, are now so commonplace
that courts must consider whether these and other deep subsurface
activities can give rise to an action in trespass.7 The current utility of such
remote underground entries challenges the notion that the right to bar
them should be the same as the right to bar surface trespass.8
To offer clarity to both judges and lawyers who must regularly
confront issues of such uncertainty, the ALI drafted the Restatements of
2. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 435 (1982).
3. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 159 (1965).
4. For additional articles that touch on this topic, see generally Owen L. Anderson,
Subsurface "Trespass": A Man's Subsurface Is Not His Castle, 49 WASHBURN L.J. 247 (2010);
Owen L. Anderson, Subsurface Trespass After Coastal v. Garza, 60 INST. ON OIL & GAS L. &
TAX'N 65 (2009); Owen L. Anderson, Geologic CO2 Sequestration: Who Owns the Pore Space?, 9
WYo. L. REV. 97 (2009); Owen L. Anderson & John D. Pigott, Seismic Technology and Law:
Partners or Adversaries?, 24 ENERGY & MIN. L. INST. 285 (2004); Owen L. Anderson,
Geophysical "Trespass" Revisited, 5 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 137 (1999); and Owen L.
Anderson & John D. Pigott, 3-D Seismic Technology: Its Uses, Limits, & Legal Ramifications, 42
ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 16-1 (1996).
5. Although I argue that some subsurface invasions should be privileged, I will, for
convenience, refer to intruding parties throughout this article as trespassers. Unless the context
indicates otherwise, when I refer to a subsurface trespasser, I am referring to a party that is
lawfully engaged in activities vis- -vis both the surface and subsurface of the land, where that
party is conducting the surface activities but where those activities result in a physical invasion of
the subsurface of neighboring land. Thus, strictly speaking, as to neighboring land, the party is a
subsurface trespasser under the common law ad coelum doctrine.
6. Though the maxim is often attributed to the advocacy of Lord Coke, its roots may be
traced to fourteenth-century Italian jurist and poet Cino da Pistoia. See Stuart S. Ball, The
Vertical Extent of Ownership in Land, 76 U. PA. L. REV. 631 (1928).
7. See, e.g., Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v. Garza Energy Trust, 268 S.W.3d 1, 29 (Tex. 2008)
(Willett, J., concurring) ("[O]rthodox trespass principles that govern surface invasions seem to
me to have dwindling subterranean relevance, particularly as exploration techniques grow ever
sophisticated.").
8. See DAN DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 55 (2000).
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the Law to provide a suitable aid for approaching complex legal questions
and to distill from the various jurisdictions the black letter law. 9 In this
regard, "the Restatement has been a vital force in shaping the law of torts
.... ."1o However, the present text of the Second Restatement of Torts
relating to subsurface trespass no longer reflects either the weight of
decisions or the proper policy. Specifically, the Second Restatement
makes no express distinction between surface trespass and harmless
subsurface intrusions, though courts have regularly done so over the past
half century. Rather, the Restatement expressly states that "a trespass
may be committed on, beneath, or above the surface of the earth."n The
lone exception carved from this broad categorization relates to airspace
intrusions -specifically, to the space used by aircraft beyond the
immediate airspace just above the surface of the earth.12 The
Restatement should distinguish in a similar fashion those subsurface
invasions that occur beyond the immediate reaches of the surface and
that cause no harm. While subsurface invasions may have a more
permanent and constant presence than airplane flyovers, the lack of
actual or substantial damage properly supports treating the two invasions
in the same manner.
While some critics may go further and argue that subsurface invasions
should be left to the law of nuisance and negligence and not trespass,'13
am reluctant to go this far, although the ALI may choose to do so.' 4 The
law relating to airspace trespass provides a more convincing and certain
guide than the much looser law of nuisance, and proving negligence
should not be required where a subsurface invasion causes substantial
9. Overview: Projects, THE AM. LAW INST., http://ali.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=about.instit
uteprojects (last visited Feb. 28, 2011).
10. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS: INTRODUCTION (1965).
11. Id. § 159.
12. Id. cmt. g. Though this exception would technically apply to any airspace, it more
generally applies to the airspace extending upward beyond the immediate reaches of the surface,
as aircraft rarely come within the useable reaches of most land. In its seminal Causby decision,
the Court granted relief to a chicken farmer who suffered actual harm resulting from low-flying
aircraft. United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 266-67 (1946).
13. See Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v. Garza Energy Trust, 268 S.W.3d 1, 30 (Tex. 2008)
(Willett, J., concurring).
14. Cf RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 159 cmt. m (1965) (providing that, in cases of
intrusions that are not within the immediate reaches of the surface, liability should rest upon the
basis of nuisance rather than trespass). I hesitate to leave subsurface invasions to the law of
nuisance because when one intentionally injects a substance that physically invades the
subsurface of a neighboring landowner, money damages should be recoverable for any actual
and substantial damage caused without having to engage in the uncertainty of balancing whether
the gravity of harm to the landowner outweighs the utility of the defendant's conduct. My
reluctance about nuisance is best expressed by the famous passage in Prosser and Keeton on the
Law of Torts: "[t]here is perhaps no more impenetrable jungle in the entire law than that which
surrounds the word 'nuisance.'" W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW
OF TORTS § 86 (5th ed. 1984). Moreover, I am reluctant to limit subsurface trespass to situations
where the trespassing injector is negligent. If a subsurface invasion causes actual and substantial
damages, proof of negligence should not be required.
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harm.
Additionally, treating deep subsurface trespasses akin to aerial
trespasses would allow the ALI to adopt my proposition without
significantly altering the current text of the Restatement. Throughout this
paper, the cases presented share a common thread: absent actual harm,
no actionable trespass results when a subsurface intrusion occurs.'s
Because modem case law addressing both aerial and deep subsurface
trespasses requires actual harm, it seems logical to adopt a uniform
exception that applies equally to both forms of trespass.
Thus, I do not suggest that the availability of a trespass cause of action
for subsurface invasions should be eliminated entirely. Rather, the ALI
should adopt a rule that would preserve a more limited claim for
trespass-one that requires proof of actual and substantial damages over
merely theoretical or speculative harm.16 Accordingly, just as the
Restatement preserves an actionable trespass where an aircraft causes
actual damages, the rule should support a claim for trespass where a deep
subsurface invasion "interferes substantially with the other's use and
enjoyment of his land."17 As such, the recovery for loss of speculative
value in a subsurface trespass action should not be permitted.
The most serious threat to efficient and utilitarian use of the
subsurface is the possibility of injunctive relief or ejectment. 8 Allowing
injunctive relief or ejectment for subsurface trespass is particularly
troubling and should be limited to situations where the harm to a
neighboring landowner clearly outweighs the utility and practical
necessity of the subsurface invasion. 19 In general, whether a particular
15. See, e.g., Hinman v. Pac. Air Lines Transp. Corp., 84 F.2d 755, 758-59 (9th Cir. 1936)
(applying California law and finding that airplanes flying within 100 feet of the surface would not
constitute a trespass "unless it is done under circumstances which will cause injury to appellants'
possession."); FPL Farming Ltd. v. Envtl. Processing Sys., L.C., 305 S.W.3d 739, 745 (Tex.
App.-Beaumont 2009, pet. granted) (rejecting plaintiffs claim that nonhazardous waste
disposal resulted in trespass, the court held "no actionable common law trespass ha[d]
occurred").
16. Thus, I reject the holding in Grynberg v. City of Northglenn, in which testing of the
subsurface by surface owner's permittee, which revealed that the property had no recoverable
coal reserves, caused speculative-value loss to the coal lessee. 739 P.2d 230, 236-38 (Colo. 1987).
I also reject the implicit holding in Marengo Cave Co. v. Ross, in which the use by an adjacent
landowner of a portion of a cave that lay beneath neighboring land would be an actionable
trespass. 10 N.E.2d 917, 923 (Ind. 1937). The primary issue in Marengo involved an assertion of
adverse possession, which would not lie under my proposed approach because the subsurface
use would be privileged. Id. at 919.
17. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 159 (1965).
18. See, e.g., Gregg v. Delhi-Taylor Oil Corp., 344 S.W.2d 411 (Tex. 1961) (suit to enjoin
hydraulic fracturing on subsurface trespass grounds).
19. Such situations should be rare, but consider a situation where a freshwater supply is
being displaced or polluted, or when injected substances leach out of what is supposed to be a
confined reservoir, causing serious pollution of the surface or subsurface that cannot otherwise
be stopped and remediated. Under such facts, injunctive relief or ejectment may be appropriate.
As another example, a mineral owner should be permitted to enjoin subsurface trespass when
necessary to allow for the diligent extraction of minerals that are actually and economically
206 [Vol. 6
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subsurface invasion should be prohibited or stopped should be left to
regulatory agencies, not to courts and landowners. Accordingly, the ALI
should prudently evaluate the appropriateness of any rule that
contemplates the availability of injunctive relief. In circumstances where
a landowner or mineral owner suffers actual and substantial subsurface
damages, 20 courts should generally limit relief to money damages and
deny injunctive relief or ejectment. 21 However, money damages should
not be permitted where the only harm alleged is the mere loss of
speculative value resulting from a subsurface trespass.
II. THE RESTATEMENT
The Second Restatement of Torts broadly construes the reaches of
liability concerning subsurface invasions. Section 158, the principal
Restatement provision pertaining to intentional trespasses, states:
One is subject to liability to another for trespass, irrespective of
whether he thereby causes harm to any legally protected interest
of the other, if he intentionally,
(a) enters land in the possession of the other, or causes a thing
or a third person to do so, or
(b) remains on the land, or
(c) fails to remove from the land a thing which he is under a
duty to remove. 22
Under the Restatement's definition of trespass, an actionable trespass
occurs upon any intrusion that "enters land" in possession of another. 23
The Restatement uses the word "intrusion" to denote specifically that a
possessor has an exclusive interest in his land, and the unprivileged
presence of any person or thing otherwise amounts to an invasion of that
interest.24 This clearly reflects the common law tendency to afford great
protection to a landowner seeking to maintain his right of exclusive
possession, 25 but some limitations must exist, especially where an owner's
recoverable and that would otherwise be displaced or become unrecoverable if the subsurface
invasion were allowed to occur.
20. Because I would require a showing of actual and substantial subsurface damages, a
plaintiff would have to show much more than a mere possibility of trespass. Cf Williams v.
Cont'1 Oil Co., 14 F.R.D. 58 (W.D. Okla. 1953). In other words, merely establishing a subsurface
intrusion is insufficient. See, e.g., Vill. of DePue, Ill. v. Viacom Int'l, Inc., 632 F. Supp. 2d 854, 865
(C.D. Ill. 2009).
21. To this limited extent, my trespass proposal is similar to nuisance cases where damages
are awarded but injunctions are denied. E.g., Boomer v. Atl. Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870, 874-
75 (N.Y. 1970) (awarding damages for nuisance but denying an injunction where the external
costs of defendant's conduct were suffered largely by a few neighboring landowners but where
the defendant's conduct provided a societal benefit).
22. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 158 (1965) (emphasis added).
23. Id. cmt. b.
24. Id. cmt. c.
25. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 14, § 13. ("It seems more reasonable to limit the recovery
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use of his property is not impaired and no harm otherwise occurs.26
Without providing exceptions for harmless subsurface invasions, the
Restatement provides a cause of action to redress a host of subsurface
activities that do no actual or substantial harm to the possessor's right of
exclusive possession.
Although actual harm need not be proved for the rules of the
Restatement to hold true, commentators readily recognize the difficulty
of applying them when the trespass occurs above or below the surface of
the land.27  The Restatement expressly addresses intrusions upon,
beneath, and above the surface of the land:
(1) Except as stated in Subsection (2), a trespass may be committed
on, beneath, or above the surface of the earth.
(2) Flight by aircraft in the air space above the land of another is a
trespass if, but only if,
(a) it enters into the immediate reaches of the air space next to
the land, and
(b) it interferes substantially with the other's use and enjoyment
of his land.28
My concern is that the Restatement offers no provision comparable to
Subsection (2) regarding subsurface trespass. The Restatement offers no
distinction between deep versus shallow subsurface invasions and as such,
directly extends its expansive scope of liability to include any activity that
occurs beneath the earth, regardless of depth.29 To support this
proposition, the ALI offers a list of older cases, 30 with perhaps the most
familiar being two cases involving caves: Edwards v. Lee and Marengo
Cave Co. v. Ross, in which both courts treated the use of a cave extending
laterally beneath neighboring land as a trespass."1 Scholars, however,
have been quick to criticize the conclusions reached in each of these
without proof of damage to cases of intentional invasion, where the trespass action may serve an
important purpose in determining and vindicating the right to exclusive possession of the
property.").
26. See Chance v. BP Chems., Inc., 670 N.E.2d 985, 992 (Ohio 1996) ("Just as a property
owner must accept some limitations on the ownership rights extending above the surface of the
property, we find that there are also limitations on property owners' subsurface rights.").
27. DOBBS, supra note 8, § 50 ("[T]he plaintiff is not required to prove actual harm to the
land or to persons or things on it; interference with possession is itself an injury for which the
plaintiff can recover at least nominal damages. These rules still hold.").
28. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 159 (1965).
29. Id. cmt. e. ("Trespass beneath the surface may be committed by ... any ... unprivileged
entry on land beneath the surface.").
30. City of Chicago v. Troy Laundry Mach. Co., 162 F. 678 (7th Cir. 1908) (applying Illinois
law); Maye v. Yappen, 23 Cal. 306 (Cal. 1863); Wachstein v. Christopher, 57 S.E. 511 (Ga. 1907);
Mamer v. Lussem, 65 Ill. 484 (Ill. 1872); Milton v. Puffer, 93 N.E. 634 (Mass. 1911); Nat'l Copper
Co. v. Minn. Mining Co., 23 N.W. 781 (Mich. 1885); Buskirk v. Strickland, 11 N.W. 210 (Mich.
1882); Huber v. Portland Gas & Coke Co., 274 P. 509 (Or. 1929).
31. Marengo Cave Co. v. Ross, 10 N.E.2d 917, 923 (Ind. 1937); Edwards v. Lee, 19 S.W.2d
992, 992 (Ky. 1929).
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cases,3 2 labeling them as "dog-in-the-manger law." 33 Moreover, in
tunneling cases that do not affect the value of the land, some would
suggest that such activities should not be regarded as a trespass at all.34 In
instances where the value of the land is not impaired and the utility to the
landowner is not otherwise compromised, courts have not often found an
actionable subsurface trespass.
The ALI need not adopt a drastic rule that excludes all subsurface
trespasses, which might include harmless shallow subsurface trespasses.
Indeed, many shallow subsurface intrusions directly affect the surface and
are thus essentially surface trespasses. Like "the immediate reaches of the
airspace,"35 the importance of protecting a possessor's exclusivity against
shallow intrusions, even where no harm occurs, should be carefully
considered.3 6 Thus, the ALI need not adopt a rule that restricts a
landowner from suing in trespass for the unauthorized connection to
private sewage lines,3 7 unauthorized placement of cable lines, 38 or any
other shallow subsurface use that could directly or indirectly impair the
surface of the property. On the other hand, for deeper subsurface
activities such as waste injection operations (e.g., C0 2, saltwater, or other
nonhazardous waste injection), gas storage operations, enhanced
recovery operations, and hydraulic fracturing, most of which result in
harmless deep subsurface invasions to neighboring property, the ALI
should except these activities from liability for trespass. Presently, such
invasions constitute intentional subsurface trespasses under the
Restatement. In adopting a new rule, the ALI would merely follow the
32. KEETON ET AL., supra note 14, § 13 (stating that because the surface owner had no
practical access to the caves, either now or in the future, the decisions are "dog-in-the-manger
law, and can only be characterized as ... very bad one[s].") (referencing Marengo Cave Co. v.
Ross, 10 N.E.2d 917 (Ind. 1937); Edwards v. Lee, 19 S.W.2d 992 (Ky. 1929)).
33. Id.; SAMUEL CROXALL, THE FABLES OF ,ESOP 63 (Flyer Townsend ed., London,
Fredrick Warne & Co. 1866) ("A Dog was lying upon a manger full of hay. An Ox, being
hungry, came near, and offered to eat of the hay; but the envious, ill-natured cur, getting up and
snarling at him, would not suffer him to touch it. Upon which the Ox, in the bitterness of his
heart, said: 'A curse light on thee for a malicious beast, who can neither eat hay thyself, nor will
allow those to eat it who can!').
34. DOBBS, supra note 8, § 55.
35. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 159 (1965).
36. Compare § 159 to comment e which expressly states that a "trespass beneath the surface
may be committed by building a foundation wall in such a way as to encroach upon neighboring
premises, or by tunneling beneath the surface of the land into adjoining land[.]" Id. cmt. e.
Though I would disagree that tunneling generally affects the surface of the land, I would not
dispute that a landowner should be able to enjoin subsurface uses that more directly affect the
surface of the land.
37. See, e.g., Lambert v. Holmberg, 712 N.W.2d 268, 275 (Neb. 2006) (citing RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 159 (1965)) (finding unauthorized connection to private sewage lines
constitutes a continuous and repeated trespass beneath the surface of the land).
38. But see Cammers v. Marion Cablevision, 354 N.E.2d 353, 356 (Ill. 1976) (finding
mandatory injunction inappropriate where cable television lines were installed without
authorization at a depth between two and three feet).
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direction courts have already taken.39
The current position advanced by the Restatement would hold a
defendant liable for at least nominal damages for any intentional
intrusions." The intentionality of any subsurface invasion is of
paramount concern, 4 1 given that it is the distinguishing factor in
apportioning liability between invasions that do cause harm and those
that do not.42 Because waste injection operations, gas storage operations,
and enhanced recovery operations would be considered intentional acts
and could be done with intent or at least knowledge that such operations
could invade neighboring subsurface, such operations would seem to be
actionable for money damages under the Restatement and possibly
subject to injunctive relief.4 3 Yet, courts have been reluctant to grant such
relief."
Most modern courts have addressed subsurface trespass similarly to
how the Restatement addresses airspace trespass. Specifically, courts
have recognized that, just as airspace ownership is subject to limitations,
so must subsurface ownership be subject to similar limits. Generally, in
both airspace and subsurface cases, an intrusion results in an actionable
trespass only where actual or substantial damages flow directly from the
intrusion. The reason courts have distinguished harmless deep subsurface
invasions from harmless shallow subsurface invasions pertains to the
potential utility of the property interest invaded, like the Restatement has
done for airspace invasions:
Sir Edward Coke once gave utterance to the statement that "cujus
est solum, ejus est usque ad coelum," which, taken literally, means
that he who owns the soil owns upward unto heaven. This has been
repeated in many cases in which there has been no question of
anything more than the immediate space above the ground. The
39. E.g., Taco Cabana, Inc. v. Exxon Corp., 5 S.W.3d 773, 780 (Tex. App.-San Antonio
1999, pet. denied) (rejecting plaintiffs theory of trespass under Restatement § 158, which
requires no showing of harm where subsurface contamination levels did not exceed thresholds
established in the state water code).
40. DOBBS, supra note 8, § 14.
41. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 163 cmt. b (1965).
42. See id. § 165 ("One who recklessly or negligently, or as a result of an abnormally
dangerous activity, enters land in the possession of another or causes a thing or third person so
to enter is subject to liability to the possessor if but only if his presence or the presence of the
thing or the third person upon the land causes harn to the land, to the possessor, or to a thing or
a third person in whose security the possessor has a legally protected interest." (emphasis
added)).
43. But cf id. § 166 ("[Aln unintentional and non-negligent entry on land in the possession of
another ... does not subject the actor to liability to the possessor." (emphasis added)).
44. E.g., Crawford v. Hrabe, 44 P.3d 442 (Kan. 2002) (enhanced recovery); FPL Farming
Ltd. v. Envtl. Processing Sys., L.C., 305 S.W.3d 739 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 2009, pet. granted)
(wastewater injection). But see Hammonds v. Cent. Ky. Natural Gas Co., 75 S.W.2d 204 (Ky.
1934), partially overruled by Tex. Am. Energy Corp. v. Citizens Fid. Bank & Trust, 736 S.W.2d
25, 28 (Ky. 1987) (gas storage).
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advent of aviation has meant that it can no longer be regarded as
law, if it ever was. There must, in the public interest, and to avoid
impossible confusion and hindrances, be limits to the upward
ownership of airspace.4 5
Just as the Restatement points out the importance of limiting the
upward ownership of the airspace, courts, which have cited this same
proposition as it applies to subsurface,46 have appropriately accepted that
similar limits should apply to the downward ownership of the subsurface.
Recognizing the parallels between aerial and deep subsurface trespasses,
the current text of the Restatement might be revised as follows:
(1) Except as stated in Subsection (2), a trespass may be committed
on, beneath, or above the surface of the earth.
(2) Flight by aircraft in the air space above the land of another [or
intrusions into the subsurface beneath the land of another] is
a trespass if, but only if,
(a) it enters into the immediate reaches of the air space [or
subsurface] next to the [surface of the] land, and(b) it interferes substantially with the other's use and enjoyment
of his land.47
With such minor changes, the Restatement could more accurately
reflect current case law trends, and the ALI would effectively advance its
ultimate goal of assisting the legal community in understanding the
evolving nature of the law. Moreover, this pragmatic approach to
harmless deep subsurface trespass, which treats possessory rights below
the surface similarly to those rights above the ground, is not only
bolstered with reference to the cases cited herein but also accords with
the opinions of scholars who have considered the issue.48 Most
importantly, such a change would further the efficient use of the deep
subsurface to meet important societal needs.
III. AIRSPACE TRESPASS LAW
The most ubiquitous use of airspace is by airplanes. As such, the
Restatement carves out an exception for air travel in its general
formulation of the law of trespass. 49 Despite the somewhat perplexing
45. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 159 cmt. g (1965) (emphasis added).
46. See, e.g., Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v. Garza Energy Trust, 268 S.W.3d 1, 11 (Tex. 2008);
FPL Farming Ltd., 305 S.W.3d at 743.
47. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 159 (1965). I realize that the ALI intends to
reorganize the Restatement (Third) of Torts so that the current provisions on trespass will be
rolled into a segment on torts related to land and water. See generally Ellen Pryor, Restatement
(Third) of Torts: Coordination and Continuation, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 1383 (2009). Since
the ALI has no proposed draft of this segment, I have elected to take this conservative approach
to suggesting new language.
48. DOBBS, supra note 8, § 55.
49. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 159 (1965).
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exercise of discretion by the ALI to limit its exception for aerial
trespasses to only aircraft, 0 recognition of the need for some limits on the
upward ownership of airspace reflects the understanding that all air travel
would be rendered impossible if every flight gave rise to a claim for
trespass.5 With this understanding, courts have universally rejected a
strict adherence to the ad coelum doctrine,5 2 generally finding the use of
airspace by airplanes non-actionable unless a landowner suffers actual
damages.5 3 Grounded in this rationale, aerial trespass cases, which have
inherently recognized the influence of new technology on the law, lend
support to my argument that the ALI should extend this rationale to
harmless deep subsurface trespasses.
Beginning with the First Restatement of Torts, the ALI has
consistently recognized that flight by aircraft should be privileged from
most claims of trespass. 54 Judicial acceptance of this caveat to the
common law's stringent protection against trespass is grounded in the
continuing need for courts "to adapt the law to the economic and social
needs of the times."55 In the case of aerial trespass, courts were quick to
recognize the importance of air transportation on society; with this in
mind, courts realized that vestiges of the common law might
unnecessarily impede the advancement of society. This much is evident in
Hinman v. Pacific Air Lines Transport Corp., where the court observed
the impracticality of the ad coelum doctrine:
This formula "from the center of the earth to the sky" was invented
at some remote time in the past when the use of space above land
actual or conceivable was confined to narrow limits, and simply
50. Id. ("The Institute expresses no opinion as to whether the rule stated in Subsection (2) is
to be applied to the flight of space rockets, satellites, missiles, and similar objects").
51. See United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 261 (1946).
52. The full statement of this doctrine relating to surface, airspace, and subsurface is: cujus
est solum, ejus est usque ad coelum et ad inferos, meaning "to whomsoever the soil belongs, he
owns also to the sky and to the depths." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1834 (9th ed. 2009).
53. E.g., Hinman v. Pac. Air Transp. Corp., 84 F.2d 755, 758-59 (9th Cir. 1936) (construing
California law and holding that use of airspace is not unlawful without proof of actual injury);
Causby, 328 U.S. at 266 (recognizing that airplanes may freely navigate airspace unless the
regularity of the flights are so low and constant as to make it impossible for the true owner to
reside upon or farm the land).
54. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 194 (1934).
An entry above the surface of the earth, in the air space in the possession of
another, by a person who is traveling in an aircraft, is privileged if the flight is
conducted:
(a) for the purpose of travel through the air space or for any other legitimate
purpose,
(b) in a reasonable manner,
(c) at such a height as not to interfere unreasonably with the possessor's
enjoyment of the surface of the earth and the air space above it, and
(d) in conformity with such regulations of the State and federal aeronautical
authorities as are in force in the particular State.
55. Swetland v. Curtiss Airports Corp., 55 F.2d 201, 203 (6th Cir. 1932) (applying Ohio law).
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meant that the owner of the land could use the overlying space to
such an extent as he was able, and that no one could ever interfere
with that use.56
In Hinman, the court observed that the doctrine was "never taken
literally, but was a figurative phrase to express the full and complete
ownership of land and the right to whatever superjacent airspace was
necessary or convenient to the enjoyment of the land.... Title to the
airspace unconnected with the use of land is inconceivable." 57 The court
then reasoned that any use of airspace that actually injures the land or
interferes with its possession or beneficial use would be a trespass, but
''any claim of the landowner beyond this cannot find a precedent in law,
nor support in reason."58 The court further reasoned that a stricter rule
would mean that "any use of airspace ... without [landowner] consent
would be a trespass either by the operator of an airplane or a radio
operator," and thus refused to "foist any such chimerical concept of
property rights upon the jurisprudence of this country."" The court
concluded that "traversing the airspace above appellants' land is not, of
itself, a trespass at all, but it is a lawful act unless it is done under
circumstances which will cause injury to appellants' possession."' The
court then held that the plaintiffs "do not, therefore, in their bill state a
case of trespass, unless they allege a case of actual and substantial
damage." 61 Because the plaintiffs had not shown actual damages, the
court denied both money damages and injunctive relief.62 In a later case,
United States v. Causby, the U.S. Supreme Court found that the particular
use of airspace by military aircraft caused actual and substantial damages
to a chicken farmer and was found to be a taking. 63 Nonetheless, what
remains evident is that "ownership rights in today's world are not so
clear-cut as they were before the advent of airplanes . . . ."I
Outside the use of aircraft, the courts have adhered to a somewhat
stricter view of airspace trespass. Understandably, consistent with the
body of case law surrounding "overhang" situations (e.g., when a
trespasser constructs an improvement or plants a tree that intrudes into
the airspace of neighboring land), the ALI does not provide a broad
exception for airspace trespass. 65 Overhang encroachments generally are
56. Hinman, 84 F.2d at 757 (construing California law).
57. Id. (responding to plaintiffs argument that they were entitled to absolute title to all
airspace to such height as may become useful but no less than 150 feet).
58. Id. at 758.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 758-59.
61. Id. at 759.
62. Id.
63. United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 265-66 (1946).
64. Chance v. BP Chems., Inc., 670 N.E.2d 985, 992 (Ohio 1996).
65. See, e.g., Geragosian v. Union Realty Co., 193 N.E. 726, 728 (Mass. 1935) (addressing an
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not necessary to meet an important societal or private commercial need.
Moreover, these encroachments generally occupy airspace near the
surface and therefore are akin to a surface invasion. Thus, in the case of
trees, the invaded landowner may trim the branches or demand their
periodic removal back to the property line, regardless of whether the
landowner suffers any actual harm.' Nevertheless, injunctive relief may
be denied where a trespassing overhang causes no actual harm to the
plaintiff landowner.67 In keeping with the Restatement's cautious
approach to exceptions, only harmless invasions, which occur outside the
readily usable reaches of the subsurface, should not be actionable in
trespass.
IV. THE STATE OF EXISTING SUBSURFACE TRESPASS LAW
Though much of the existing subsurface trespass case law is consistent
with my suggested modifications to the Restatement, the case law does
not always directly deal with the trespass issue because the chief concern
of the litigants may be something else. For that reason, I have grouped
the case law by particular subsurface uses, as the type of use often
influences the actual issue put before the court and thus the outcome of
the case. Despite this lack of cohesion, my general proposition -that the
ALI should treat subsurface intrusions the same as airspace intrusions -is
well supported.
A. Traditional Oil and Gas Trespass Cases
In the context of oil and gas development, the most obvious example
of a non-trespass occurs when an operator drills a directional or
horizontal oil or gas well beneath a neighboring tract that is included
within a drilling unit for that well.68 These cases, however, are of little
support. The proper establishment of a unit exempts such subsurface use
either under the spacing and pooling provisions of the applicable oil and
gas conservation act or under the pooling clause of an oil and gas lease.
On the other hand, the most obvious example of actionable trespass is
the drilling of a directional well that bottoms out beneath neighboring
property that is not part of the drilling unit for that well. 69 The
overhanging fire escape).
66. See, e.g., Jones v. Wagner, 624 A.2d 166, 168 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993).
67. Geragosian, 193 N.E. at 726-28.
68. See, e.g., Nunez v. Wainoco Oil & Gas Co., 488 So. 2d 955, 964 (La. 1986); Kysar v.
Amoco Prod. Co., 93 P.3d 1272, 1282 (N.M. 2004); Cont'l Res., Inc. v. Farrar Oil Co., 559
N.W.2d 841,846 (N.D. 1997).
69. See, e.g., Alphonzo E. Bell Corp. v. Bell View Oil Syndicate, 76 P.2d 167, 171-72 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1938); Gliptis v. Fifteen Oil Co., 16 So. 2d 471, 474 (La. 1944). In the context of hard
minerals, mining beneath another's property constitutes a similar trespass. See, e.g., Del Monte
Mining & Milling Co. v. Last Chance Mining & Milling Co., 171 U.S. 55, 65-67 (1898). English
cases treated mining beneath another's property as fraud. Livingston v. Rawyards (1880) L.R. 5
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Restatement should continue to consider such trespasses actionable
because the trespass is not necessary for the exploitation of oil and gas
resources since a non-trespassing well either could be drilled to exploit
the same resources or would be a dry hole, which in the latter case would
not give the trespasser a correlative right to the oil and gas reservoir.
Accordingly, even with the revisions suggested, such entries that
"interfere substantially with the other's use and enjoyment" would
remain actionable. 70
In a directional trespass action, the plaintiff will often assert and prove
bad faith conversion of oil and gas, which ordinarily achieves a higher
recovery than a claim for trespass damages.7 1 Because of the rule of
capture, the oil and gas converted by the trespasser is generally held to be
100% of the production, even though some of the oil and gas may have
been drained from beneath the trespasser's own land.7 2 In addition to
money damages, such a trespass may be enjoined in appropriate
circumstances. 73 The actual measure of damages for conversion is either
the net value or gross value of the converted minerals or hydrocarbons.74
If the court finds that the trespass was committed in good faith (i.e., the
trespasser reasonably believed that he was not trespassing), the court will
limit the award of damages to net value by allowing the trespasser to
deduct the costs of mining or drilling and production in the course of
accounting to the rightful owner for the conversion. 75 The ability to
deduct costs, however, also depends on whether the mining or
hydrocarbon production was economically beneficial to the true owner.76
On the other hand, if the court finds that the trespass was committed in
bad faith77 or if the true owner did not economically benefit from mining
or hydrocarbon production, the court will award the gross value of the
converted minerals or hydrocarbons without allowing the trespasser to
deduct costs.78 Such a remedy serves as a form of punitive damages and
discourages the actor from future similar conduct.79 If prices are volatile,
App.Cas. 34; Hilton v. Woods, L.R. 4 Eq.Cas. 440; Dean v. Thwaite, 21 Beav. 623; Ecclesiastical
Comm'rs for Eng. v. N. E. Ry. Co., L.R. 4, Ch.Div. 860; Trotter v. McLean, L.R. 13, Ch.Div. 585.
70. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 159 (1965).
71. See, e.g., Pan Am. Petroleum Corp. v. Long, 340 F.2d 211, 220 (5th Cir. 1964) (construing
Texas law).
72. See, e.g., Edwards v. Lachman, 534 P.2d 670, 675-76 (Okla. 1974). In Gribben v.
Carpenter, 185 A. 712, 715-16 (Pa. 1936), the court awarded damages for the full value of all gas
produced and commingled from a trespass well and from a lawful well.
73. See, e.g., Hastings Oil Co. v. Tex. Co., 234 S.W.2d 389, 392 (Tex. 1950).
74. See, e.g., Wronski v. Sun Oil Co., 279 N.W.2d 564, 571 (Mich. Ct. App. 1979).
75. See, e.g., Rudy v. Ellis, 236 S.W.2d 466, 468 (Ky. 1951).
76. See, e.g., Edwards, 534 P.2d at 675.
77. In some states, willful trespass is presumed, and this presumption must then be overcome
by evidence of good faith. See, e.g., Rudy, 236 S.W.2d at 528-29.
7& See, e.g., Mayfield v. Benavides, 693 S.W.2d 500, 506 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1985, writ
ref'd n.r.e.).
79. See, e.g., Wronski, 279 N.W.2d at 572.
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a bad faith trespasser may also be required to account for gross value at
the highest market value between the time of conversion and filing of the
claim.80
In cases of directional trespass resulting in a dry hole, courts have
allowed recovery for any resulting devaluation of the land caused by the
dry hole.81 In instances of seismic trespasses, courts have permitted
affected landowners to waive their trespass claim and sue in assumpsit. 2
The consistency with which courts have awarded damages in each of
these contexts reflects the willingness of courts to grant relief upon a
showing of actual harm to the affected land, in either physical or
economic terms. As such, should the ALI undertake to modify its current
text, it should preserve a cause of action to remediate the harm caused by
directional drilling for oil and gas that results in a subsurface trespass.
B. Subsurface Trespass Resulting From Hydraulic Fracturing
In Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v. Garza Energy Trust, addressing
subsurface trespass in the context of hydraulic fracturing, the court's
recognition of the impact of technological advances on hydrocarbon
recovery illustrates why the ALI should consider revising its
Restatement.83 In this case, the Texas Supreme Court held that a
subsurface invasion by a hydraulic fracturing operation was not an
actionable trespass because the resulting damage-the drainage of
hydrocarbons-was protected by the rule of capture. 4 Despite the fact
that Garza fails to offer direct support given its reliance on the rule of
capture, it nonetheless advances the revisions proposed. Specifically, the
court offered no sympathy to plaintiffs who alleged a subsurface trespass
that caused no actual, substantial, and legally recoverable damages. As
such, Garza serves as another example of the judicial trend to refuse
claims for harmless subsurface intrusions.
The court recognized that the plaintiffs were harmed by the increased
80. See, e.g., Champlin Ref. Co. v. Aladdin Petroleum Corp., 238 P.2d 827, 830 (Okla. 1951);
Probst v. Bearman, 183 P. 886, 888 (Okla. 1919).
81. Recovery has been allowed in cases dealing with surface and subsurface trespass and
vertical drilling. E.g., Matheson v. Placid Oil Co., 33 So. 2d 527, 531 (La. 1947); Humble Oil &
Ref. Co. v. Kishi, 276 S.W. 190, 191 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1925). But see Martel v. Hall Oil Co.,
253 P. 862, 867 (Wyo. 1927) (denying damages when a trespasser drilled a dry hole).
82. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Cowden, 241 F.2d 586, 592 (5th Cir. 1957) (applying Texas law).
Fortunately, the efficacy of this dictum can now be seriously questioned in light of Coastal Oil &
Gas Corp. v. Garza Energy Trust, which held that hydraulic fracturing that encroaches into
nearby property and results in drainage of hydrocarbons is not actionable because the drainage
is protected by the rule of capture. 268 S.W.3d 1, 4 (Tex. 2008).
83. See generally Garza, 268 S.W.3d 1.
84. Id. at 13-15. In People's Gas Co. v. Tyner, the Indiana Supreme Court held that the
analogous technique of shooting a well to prime recovery was protected by the rule of capture
but also subject to the law of nuisance where the shooting, which was done with nitroglycerin,
posed a danger to a densely populated area. 31 N.E. 59, 60 (Ind. 1892).
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drainage, but this harm was attributable only to the increased drainage
resulting from the hydraulic fracturing operations, not the physical
trespass of the fracturing fluids and proppants.81 Moreover, the harm
caused by drainage was not actionable because the drainage was
privileged under the rule of capture and thus shielded the draining party
from liability as a matter of law. 86 The court reached this decision even
though the jury found that a subsurface trespass occurred when the
defendants injected fluids and proppants.87 The court tried to explain
away this invasion by reasoning that the drained oil had actually been
captured in the wellbore beneath the defendants' land rather than by the
fractures.88 Justice Willett, in his concurring opinion, went even further,
suggesting that hydraulic fracturing results in "no trespass at all." 89
Fortunately, the majority offered a more convincing public policy reason
for its decision: Hydraulic fracturing prevents underground waste by
facilitating hydrocarbon recovery from tight reservoirs not otherwise
considered productive. 90 Thus, hydraulic fracturing was necessary to meet
an important societal need, the fluids and proppants caused no actual and
substantial harm, and the resulting drainage was privileged.
Consistent with my proposed revisions to the Restatement, the court
did suggest that it might grant trespass relief if the plaintiffs could show
other harm, such as damage to wellbores on their property.91 The logic of
the court's decision is: (1) there was a subsurface invasion of a common
reservoir; (2) the subsurface invasion may have caused substantial
drainage of hydrocarbons from beneath the invaded property but no
other apparent damage; and (3) the rule of capture barred recovery for
this drainage.Y Thus, actual recoverable damage was an essential element
for relief.93 In terms of the broader subject of subsurface trespass, the
85. Garza, 268 S.W.3d at 13-14.
86. Id. at 14.
87. Id. at 8.
88. Id. at 14.
89. Id. at 29.
90. Id. at 16-17. Professor David Pierce criticizes the court's reliance on a trespass and rule
of capture analysis, arguing that the court should have grounded its decision in the doctrine of
correlative rights-the flip side of the rule of capture coin. Under this approach, the court would
have first addressed whether hydraulic fracturing was a permissible operation to develop a
common reservoir. If the court determined that hydraulic fracturing was within an operator's
correlative right to capture a fair share of the hydrocarbons from a common reservoir, then the
rule of capture would bar damages. David E. Pierce, Minimizing the Environmental Impact of
Oil and Gas Development by Maximizing Production Conservation, 85 N.D. L. REV. 759, 761
(2009).
91. Garza, 268 S.W.3d at 17.
92 See generally Garza, 268 S.W.3d 1.
93. Id. at 11. The court did begin its analysis by finding that, because the cause of action was
filed by a lessor, the proper action lay in trespass on the case, for harm to lessor's reversion,
rather than in trespass quare clausem fregit, which could have been brought by the holder of a
present possessory interest. Id. at 9-11. The court held that the lessor had standing to sue for
trespass on the case, but the court further held that this action required a showing of actual
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most important statement in Garza is the court's observation that "[t]he
law of trespass need no more be the same two miles below the surface
than two miles above." 94
C. Subsurface Trespass Resulting From Horizontal Drilling and Improper
Pooling
A potentially troublesome area involves horizontal drilling. In
Browning Oil Co. v. Luecke, the lessors, collectively called the Lueckes,
executed three leases that contained pooling clauses.95 However, the
power to pool was limited by anti-dilution provisions requiring that any
pooled unit comprise at least 60% Luecke land. 96 The lessees exercised
their pooling power by forming two units and then drilled two horizontal
wells, but each unit violated the anti-dilution provision of the Luecke
leases.97 The surface location for the first well was located on Luecke
land, but the horizontal portion of the wellbore traversed into some non-
Luecke land. 98 The surface location for the second well was not on
Luecke land, but the horizontal portion of the wellbore traversed through
two separate parcels of Luecke land. 99 Because the units violated the
anti-dilution provision-an express limitation on the lessees' pooling
power-the Lueckes claimed royalty on all production from the first well.
Additionally, because the wellbore for the second well traversed through
two separate Luecke tracts, they aggressively sought double royalty on all
production from that well.1oo
The trial court found that the anti-dilution provision applied to
horizontal wells and that the lessees had breached the provision. The
lessees appealed."o' After much discussion, the appellate court
determined that the measure of damages sought by the Lueckes was
unworkable and punitive, citing the fact that the horizontal wellbores
physically traversed and perforated both Luecke land and non-Luecke
land." In reaching its conclusion, the court found that the Lueckes' claim
to entitlement of royalties on all production failed because "the
damage. Id. at 11. This should not be read as implying that the holder of a present possessory
interest would not be required to show actual damages to enjoin hydraulic fracturing; however,
the court did suggest that the holder of a possessory interest may be entitled to recover nominal
damages. Id. The prospect of nominal damages for subsurface trespass does not threaten
valuable subsurface uses, but injunctive relief certainly would.
94. Id. at 11.
95. Browning Oil Co. v. Luecke, 38 S.W.3d 625, 636 (Tex. App.-Austin 2000, pet. denied).
96. Id. at 637.
97. Id. at 638-39.
98. Id. at 638.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 639.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 645.
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geophysical characteristics of the formation actually inhibit the natural
drainage underlying the rule of capture[.]"1 03 In further support, the court
noted the following:
Simply put, the migratory nature of oil and gas that supplies the
rationale for the rule of capture and the Lueckes' claim to all
production from neighboring tracts does not apply to horizontal
wells drilled in highly fractured formations.'0
... .Thus, each point along the drainhole is contributing to
production from isolated fractures, and no one drillsite is naturally
draining minerals from all of the penetrated tracts. Even though the
rule of capture and other principles of oil and gas law would afford
the Lueckes royalties on all production if a vertical well were drilled
on their land without valid pooling, these principles have no
application in the case of horizontal wells that contain multiple
drillsites on tracts owned by multiple landowners. os
Was the court's refusal to apply the rule of capture to horizontal
drilling correct? More particularly, should the rule of capture be applied
to a hydraulically fractured horizontal well in a Garza-like trespass
situation? The ALI should discount the position taken in Luecke. The
Texas Supreme Court is not likely to distinguish Garza by refusing to
apply the rule of capture to a well that is partially horizontal as opposed
to only vertical, so long as the fluids and proppants, and not the
horizontal portion of the wellbore, are the only intrusions into
neighboring property. 106 Although hydraulically fracturing a horizontal
well is a completion technique whereas waterflooding is a secondary
recovery technique, the two are not so different: both result in the
production of hydrocarbons that would not be recovered absent the
subsurface invasion of the horizontal wellbore or the injected water.
Thus, the Texas Supreme Court would likely hold that the rule of capture
applies to a hydraulically fractured horizontal well-just as it did in
Garza, when the court cited and relied upon its prior Manziel decision
that dealt with waterflooding.101 In any event, while Luecke seems
103. Id.
104. Id. at 646.
105. Id.
106. Moreover, I think the Texas Court of Appeals' holding in Browning regarding the
measure of damages emasculated the anti-dilution clause of the Lueckes' leases. Recognizing the
fact that the well was not wholly confined to Luecke tracts, I submit that the appropriate
measure of damages should have been the difference between the royalty that the Lueckes
received under the unit as formed and the royalty the Lueckes would have received if the unit
had been properly formed in compliance with the anti-dilution clause. Cf Sw. Gas Producing
Co. v. Seale, 191 So. 2d 115 (Miss. 1966). The fact that the Lueckes claimed double royalty on
the well that traversed two of their tracts and then lost on appeal is an example of the old saw:
"Pigs get fed. Hogs get slaughtered."
107. Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v. Garza Energy Trust, 268 S.W.3d 1, 12 (Tex. 2008). Also, see
infra Section IV(F) for discussion of R.R. Comm'n v. Manziel, 361 S.W.2d 560 (Tex. 1962).
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inconsistent with Garza on the rule of capture, Luecke does not directly
address subsurface trespass.
D. Subsurface Trespass Resulting From Subsurface Use to Access
Minerals Beneath Other Lands
Suppose that an operator who holds the right to develop Tract B
locates a well on the surface of Tract A and uses the surface and
subsurface of Tract A to gain access to the Tract B hydrocarbons.
Further, suppose that the Tract A surface owner gave the operator
permission to use both the surface and subsurface of Tract A for this
purpose but that the mineral (hydrocarbon) owner of Tract A did not.
Additionally, the surface of Tract B will not readily accommodate an
efficient well location, and all well perforations comply with conservation
regulations and are limited to Tract B. Given the intentional nature of the
intrusions against the mineral owner of Tract A, the Restatement would
hold that the operator has committed an actionable trespass. 108 However,
in these circumstances, to the extent the operator makes use of Tract A
with the surface owner's permission, courts should find otherwise. In
other words, using the subsurface of Tract A should not constitute a
trespass against the mineral owner unless the mineral owner suffers
actual and substantial harm beyond drainage-such as where the location
of the well or wellbore leaves no suitable well or wellbore location for the
mineral owner to exploit the minerals beneath Tract A.
So long as the well is perforated only beneath Tract B, any resulting
drainage of Tract A should be protected under the rule of capture, and
use of the surface and subsurface of Tract A should not be grounds for an
"obstruction" claim by the Tract A mineral owner. In contrast, however,
the current text of the Restatement supports a trespass claim that
inevitably could lead to underground waste of hydrocarbons. If the courts
were to hold that the mineral owner must consent to such use, then the
drilling party would likely need to secure the unanimous consent of all
co-tenant mineral owners.10 Due to the proliferation of fractional
mineral ownership, obtaining unanimous consent is often difficult and
costly, 110 especially since mineral owners have a natural incentive to deny
access because of the drainage they might suffer.
108. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 158 (1965).
109. See, e.g., Elliott v. Elliott, 597 S.W.2d 795, 802 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1980,
writ ref'd).
110. In Ellis v. Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co., the court observed that if "the mineral interest
owner and not the surface owner ... had the power to grant storage rights, it would typically
mean that hundreds of severed mineral interest owners would have to be contacted if those
rights were to be obtained privately." 450 F. Supp. 412, 422 (E.D. Okla. 1978), aff'd, 609 F.2d 436
(10th Cir. 1979).
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Though the cases addressing the topic have been somewhat mixed,"
each offers insight into the appropriate role that damages have played in
the courts' consideration of physical, though harmless, trespasses. In
Atlantic Refining Co. v. Bright & Schiff, oil and gas lessors, who were also
the apparent surface owners, entered into a surface lease that allowed an
oil and gas operator on neighboring property to temporarily locate pits,
pumps, and tanks incident to drilling on the surface so the operator could
drill a well on its own property." 2 The oil and gas lessee challenged the
right of its lessors to issue a surface lease that facilitated drilling on other
land. 113 The court rejected this challenge, noting that the lessee "must
prove that the use interferes with the reasonable exercise of his own
rights under his own lease." 114 The court found that "[t]o do this he must
prove that he needs the surface at the time and place then being used by
the other user.""' The court also rejected the lessee's concern that the
well in question would end up draining the lessee's tract.116 The court
concluded, "[d]rainage presents no new problem. The rule of capture is
settled law."" 7 Accordingly, the court refused to enjoin the lessee's
operations as an instrument to protect the lessee "from the risk of
drainage."118
In Grubstake Investment Ass'n. v. Coyle, an oil and gas lessee of land
adjacent to a river challenged the right of the operator-lessee of the
riverbed to erect on the land, with the surface owner's permission, "a
small [sic] tollhouse, a boiler, small tanks, and a tent" to aid drilling a well
beneath the riverbed.119 Noting that the well itself was not located on the
land at issue, the appellate court affirmed the jury's decision that the
operator's surface use did not interfere with the lessee's rights to develop
its lease.12 0 Thus, the use could not be barred by the complaining lessee.' 2'
Dictum in Union Oil Co. of California v. Domengeaux suggests that in
some cases, a trespassing slant well might not be enjoined:
[W]e do not wish to be understood as holding that every subsurface
111. Even express contract provisions are sometimes unenforceable on the ground of public
policy. In the subsurface trespass context, see Lachman v. Sperry-Sun Well Surveying Co., 457
F.2d 850, 853 (10th Cir. 1972) (construing Oklahoma law and refusing to enforce confidentiality
agreement to conceal a directional wellbore that trespassed beneath neighboring land).
112. Atlantic Ref. Co. v. Bright & Schiff, 321 S.W.2d 167, 168 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio
1959, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
113. Id.
114. Id. at 169.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 170.
119. Grubstake Inv. Ass'n. v. Coyle, 269 S.W. 854, 854 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1925,
writ dism'd w.o.j.).
120. Id. at 856.
121. Id.
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trespass in the drilling of an oil well would warrant injunctive relief.
We can conceive of an oil well deviating slightly from the
perpendicular, trespassing to a small extent upon the land of an
adjoining owner and returning to oil-producing strata within the
property of the owner of the well. In such case, the damage, if any, to
the adjoining owner might be said to be wholly inconsequential and
equitable relief might properly be withheld[.]1 22
While this dictum suggests a minor and perhaps unintentional
trespass, 123 it also suggests that the subsurface owner would have to suffer
actual and substantial damages before relief- including equitable
relief-will be granted, even though the wellbore would constitute a
continuing trespass. 124
In Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. L. & G. Oil Co., the plaintiff, an oil
and gas lessee, was not allowed to prevent another operator from using
the surface of a one-acre leasehold as a well site to drill a slant well to
access hydrocarbons from beneath a railroad right of way.125 The
operators had acquired fee title to the one-acre tract, subject to the
plaintiff's oil and gas lease. 126 The court summarily affirmed the trial
court's finding of fact that the well did not interfere with the plaintiff's
leasehold rights. 127
However, in Mid-Texas Petroleum Co. v. Colcord the court allowed
the oil and gas lessees to enjoin the drilling of slant wells by another
operator on two of their leased tracts. 128 The operator sought to access
hydrocarbons beneath an adjacent riverbed. However, the court found
that the whole surface was needed by the lessees under the particular
circumstances. 129 At first blush, the finding that the whole surface was
needed by the lessees seems questionable given that the area at issue
122. Union Oil Co. of Cal. v. Domengeaux, 86 P.2d 127, 130 (Cal. Ct. App. 1939).
123. The Restatement carves exceptions for mistaken unintentional trespasses. However,
most trespasses involving oil and gas drilling or subsurface injection or storage would not
properly be considered unintentional. See Terre Aux Boeufs Land Co. v. J. R. Gray Barge Co.,
803 So. 2d 86, 95-96 (La. Ct. App. 2001) (finding that subsurface drilling operations where
operator's wellbore was inadvertently bottomed beneath neighboring property were still
"intentional actions ... despite the fact that the defendants did not intend to trespass when they
took those actions").
124. But see Gliptis v. Fifteen Oil Co., 16 So. 2d 471, 474 (La. 1944) ("Any unlawful physical
invasion of the property of another is a trespass[,]" regardless of whether a trespass is
intentional.) (emphasis added); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 166 (1965) ("[An
unintentional and non-negligent entry on land in the possession of another . .. does not subject
the actor to liability to the possessor, even though the entry causes harm[.]") (emphasis added).
125. Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. L. & G. Oil Co., 259 S.W.2d 933, 934 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin
1953, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
126. Id.
127. Id. at 938.
128. Mid-Texas Petroleum Co. v. Colcord, 235 S.W. 710, 711 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth
1921, writ ref'd).
129. Id.
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comprised two 20-acre tracts. 130 But the extent of surface use by the
surface owners and the anticipated surface use by the slant-well operators
was not fully explained. The tracts in question were long, narrow, and
adjacent to the riverbed, and they apparently were underlain with three
productive sands."'1 Thus, the shape of the tracts and the date of case,
1921, suggests that both the slant-well operators and the lessees might
each have intended to use much of the surface of both tracts to drill
multiple single completion wells and associated facilities. Moreover, the
court reasoned that the plaintiff-lessees would need the surface because
they would be obliged to offset each of the slant wells to prevent drainage
from beneath their lease.132 In this regard, the court did not seem
troubled by the idea that the slant wells would drain the leasehold, but it
did recognize that the lessees would need the entire surface to drill
appropriate offsetting wells.'33 Today, given modern well spacing laws
and multiple completion technologies, a court would likely not make the
same findings of fact regarding the need for the lessees to use the entire
surface of two 20-acre tracts.
Unfortunately, a more recent case, Chevron Oil Co. v. Howell,
suggests a similar result. Here, the court appears to have assumed,
without expressly deciding, that both a surface tenant and an oil and gas
lessee could enjoin the slant-well operations of another party who was
seeking to access hydrocarbons beneath an adjacent riverbed. 134 The
slant-well operator claimed to have a license from the United States, as
surface owner, to locate the slant well on the premises.135 However, the
court found that the operator's documentation did not grant such a
license and therefore allowed both the surface tenant and the mineral
lessee to enjoin the operation.13 6 In so doing, the court found that "[t]he
testimony of appellant's own witness, its superintendent, was to the effect
that to drill the hole is to damage the formation-'any time you drill into
something there is bound to be some damage."'137 The court then
concluded that "continuous trespasses to mining property are irreparable
and the legal remedy is inadequate, hence equity is quick to restrain the
trespass.... [E]quity will intervene to avoid the necessity of the filing of a
multiplicity of damage suits by the aggrieved party in cases involving
continuing trespasses."' 38 Because the operator did not have permission
130. Id.
131. Id. at 711, 714.
132. Id. at 714.
133. Id.
134. See Chevron Oil Co. v. Howell, 407 S.W.2d 525, 525 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1966, writ
ref'd n.r.e.).
135. Id. at 527.
136. Id. at 528.
137. Id.
138. Id. (citation omitted).
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to use the surface, the court properly enjoined the operation under these
facts. However, the court's reasoning is troubling in that it appears to
allow the mineral owner to enjoin any such use on the ground that "any
time you drill into something there is bound to be some damage."3 9
Two California cases support the right of a mineral owner to enjoin use
of the surface by another hydrocarbon operator on the grounds of
trespass.140 One case cites the drainage of a common pool as the primary
basis for injunctive relief.141 The other case relies on the language of the
instrument giving "exclusive" rights to the hydrocarbon claimant.142
However, in contrast to Garza, neither case addressed whether damages
caused by drainage should be protected under the rule of capture. 143
Moreover, neither case considered whether its ruling could lead to
economic or underground waste.
In Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Cowden, the court recognized that the
surface owner and the mineral owner may concurrently hold the rights to
use the surface of their property to conduct seismic surveying for the
purpose of exploring nearby property.'" The court reached this
conclusion on the ground that any gathered information about nearby
property is bound to be even more informative about the occupied
property.145 If the targeted area of the survey includes the land at issue,
then one mineral interest owner of that property should have to grant
permission.146 However, the occupied land may not be the targeted area
in the case of 3-D seismic. In a 3-D survey, data is gathered from above
and around the targeted area.
As I have previously written, the rule of capture should protect the
139. Id.
140. See New v. New, 306 P.2d 987, 996 (Cal. Ct. App. 1957); Hancock Oil Co. v. Meeker-
Garner Oil Co., 257 P.2d 988, 992 (Cal. Ct. App. 1953) (mineral owner allowed to enjoin use of
surface by mineral operator to develop adjoining land even though the operator had secured
permission from the surface owner).
141. Hancock, 257 P.2d at 991-92.
142. New, 306 P.2d at 996 (stating that mineral claimants held an instrument giving them the
"the exclusive right to enter upon said lands . . . for [drilling] purposes"). The court concluded,
"Though the matter is not free from doubt, we think this instrument conferred upon the
contractor exclusive use of the surface so far as producing oil from the premises was concerned."
Id. Other cases have addressed the question of whether a lease confers "exclusive" rights to
explore for minerals, and have often turned on the express language of the lease. Shell
Petroleum Corp. v. Puckett, 29 S.W.2d 809, 810 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1930, writ ref'd)
(exploration rights were non-exclusive under the lease); Wilson v. Texas Co., 237 S.W.2d 649,
650 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1951, writ refd n.r.e.) (exploration rights were "exclusive" by
express language in the lease).
143. See discussion supra Part IV(B).
144. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Cowden, 241 F.2d 586, 590 (5th Cir. 1957) (construing Texas
law).
145. Id. at 590-91.
146. I say "one" mineral owner because in Enron Oil & Gas Co. v. Worth, 947 P.2d 610, 613
(Okla. Civ. App. 1997), the court held that seismic operations could be conducted by the owner
of a fractional mineral interest even though all mineral interest owners may be affected by the
seismic operations.
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gathering of seismic information from nearby lands so long as there is no
surface trespass.147 Applying the rule of capture will prevent the
economic waste of having gathered information but not being able to use
the information that directly relates to invaded land.
While the results of these cases are mixed, the better reasoned cases
are those that support the use of the surface and subsurface of Tract A to
gain access to Tract B without the need to secure permission from the
Tract A mineral owner. In addressing subsurface use courts should go
one step further: the drilling party should be permitted to use the
subsurface of Tract C (a tract between Tract A and B) if necessary to
gain access to Tract B's hydrocarbons without securing permission from
either the surface or mineral owner so long as the well bore is not
perforated to produce hydrocarbons directly from Tract B.
E. Subsurface Trespass Resulting From Waste Disposal Operations
A regulatory body, such as an oil and gas conservation agency, has no
general authority to authorize trespasses or other torts.148 Nevertheless, a
trespasser in possession of a regulatory permit may have some insulation
from trespass claims. The most obvious example is to assist in responding
to an emergency by extinguishing a well blowout and fire. 149 Temporary
invasions are also privileged if necessary to establish justice, such as
performing a directional survey of a wellbore that may be encroaching on
neighboring land.1so The current text of the Restatement reflects similar
notions, as it permits entry onto another's land in a variety of privileged
circumstances. 151 The underlying rationale is that in certain
circumstances, entry onto another's property is justified. 5 2 For "[i]t is a
very ancient rule of the common law, that an entry upon land to save
goods which are in jeopardy of being lost or destroyed ... is not a
trespass."153 But questions arise concerning the appropriateness of
privileged entries where an intrusion is not founded upon averting some
imminent danger or threat to the public or upon a property owner's need
to recover chattels. Particularly, what happens in instances where the
state issues a regulatory permit and the permittee, in direct facilitation of
its own commercial interests, then commits a subsurface trespass?
147. See generally Owen L. Anderson & John D. Pigott, 3-D Seismic Technology: Its Uses,
Limits, & Legal Ramifications, 42 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 16-1, 16-111 to -117 (1996).
14& See, e.g., Berkley v. R.R. Comm'n, 282 S.W.3d 240, 243 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2009, no
pet.).
149. See, e.g., Corzelius v. R.R. Comm'n, 182 S.W.2d 412, 413-14 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin
1944, no writ).
150. See, e.g., Williams v. Cont'1 Oil Co., 14 F.R.D. 58, 64 (W.D. Okla. 1953); Gliptis v.
Fifteen Oil Co., 16 So. 2d 471, 482 (La. 1944).
151. Cf RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 191-211 (1965).
152. See, e.g., Hanson v. Carroll, 52 A.2d 700, 701 (Conn. 1947).
153. Proctor v. Adams, 113 Mass. 376, 377-78 (1873).
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The simplest form of such a subsurface trespass occurs in the context
of waste disposal, including wastewater disposal, because the focus of the
court is on the invading waste. Wastewater disposal cases indicate that
courts are reluctant to allow a trespass claim absent actual damages-at
least where, as is typically the case, the disposing party has a regulatory
permit.
In FPL Farming, Ltd. v. Texas Natural Resources Conservation
Commission, the state regulatory agency issued permits for disposal of
non-hazardous waste at depths between 7,350 and 8,200 feet below the
surface. 15 4 Before issuing the permit the agency required the applicant to
project how far and in what directions the waste might migrate over a 30-
year period.155 When neighboring surface owners discovered that the
injected waste was projected to reach their subsurface strata within ten
years, they asserted that the agency was authorizing an impairment of
their subsurface rights.15 6 The court acknowledged a legal trend that
"property owners do not have the right to exclude deep subsurface
migration of fluids"l 57 and rejected the argument that "migration alone
will impair [their] existing rights."1 8 The court concluded that "some
measure of harm must accompany the migration."159 "[B]ecause of [the
agency's] ... expertise in the geological effects of subsurface migration of
injectates," the court deferred to the agency's finding that, in this case, no
existing rights would be impaired by the injection operations.160
Nevertheless, the court indicated that if the waste did migrate and cause
some measure of harm, the surface owners could seek damages from the
injector. 161
Three years after the court of appeals handed down its decision, FPL
filed a separate suit to enjoin EPS's operations and alleged claims for
trespass, unjust enrichment, and negligence. 162 Not surprisingly, the trial
court rejected each of FPL's contentions, as subsurface migration and
actual harm are generally difficult to prove, 163 and FPL filed timely notice
154. FPL Farming, Ltd. v. Tex. Natural Res. Conservation Comm'n, No. 03-02-00477-CV,
2003 WL 247183 at *1 (Tex. App.-Austin 2003, pet. denied) (mem. op.).
155. Id.
156. Id. at *2.
157. Id. at *3 (citing United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 260-61 (1946); Raymond v.
Union Tex. Petroleum Corp., 697 F. Supp. 270, 274-75 (E.D. La. 1988); Chance v. BP Chems.,
Inc., 670 N.E.2d 985, 991-92 (Ohio 1996); R.R. Comm'n v. Manziel, 361 S.W.2d 560, 568-69
(Tex. 1962)).
158. Id. at *4.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id. at *5.
162. FPL Farming Ltd. v. Envtl. Processing Sys., L.C., 305 S.W.3d 739, 742 (Tex.App.-
Beaumont 2009, pet. granted).
163. Id. See also Mongrue v. Monsanto Co., 249 F.3d 422, 433 (5th Cir. 2001) (construing
Louisiana law); Chance v. BP Chems., Inc., 670 N.E.2d 985, 985 (Ohio 1996). But see Starrh &
Starrh Cotton Growers v. Aera Energy LLC, 63 Cal. Rptr. 3d 165, 169-70 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007)
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of its appeal16" As an initial matter, the court considered whether FPL
had a trespass claim even though the agency had approved EPS's
amended permit while fully knowing that the injected wastewater was
expected to migrate into the deep subsurface beneath FPL's property. 165
The court found the Texas Supreme Court's prior decisions in Garza and
Manziel controlling.166 Specifically, the court noted that, like the agency-
approved subsurface migration of injected saltwater in Manziel, which
"did not cause a trespass when the water migrated across property lines,"
the state agency's authorization of EPS's amended permit presented the
court with an analogous case.16 1 While noting that "the rules of trespass
were 'technical' and should not affect the validity of the Railroad
Commission's orders," the court nonetheless recognized that Manziel
"relied heavily on the fact that the [Railroad] Commission had approved
the operation."1 68 In the same vein, however, the court considered the
policy and purposes of the Injection Well Act given that "the
Commission in this case also was required to consider various
interests."169 The court ultimately held that "under the common law,
when a state agency has authorized deep subsurface injections, no
trespass occurs when fluids that were injected at deep levels are then
alleged to have later migrated at those deep levels into the deep
subsurface of nearby tracts."' As such, the court determined that "no
actionable common law trespass [had] occurred .... ."171
Likewise, in Raymond v. Union Texas Petroleum Corp. the plaintiffs
claimed that saltwater injected under adjacent lands migrated to their
subsurface property.172 Noting that the state regulatory agency had issued
a permit for the saltwater injection, the federal district court in Louisiana
concluded that such migration "is not unlawful and does not constitute a
legally actionable trespass." 173 In dictum, however, the court
acknowledged that a permit does not preclude recovery for actual
damages. 174
(describing how wastewater from oil well percolated from a surface pit and migrated to
neighboring land, causing degradation of water, which if returned to its natural state, had some
potential value for irrigating certain salt-tolerant crops).
164. FPL Farming Ltd., 305 S.W.3d at 741.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 742-45. Garza is discussed supra Section IV(B); Manziel is discussed infra Section
IV(F).
167. Id. at 743.
168. Id. at 744 (citations omitted).
169. Id.
170. Id. at 744-45.
171. Id. at 745.
172. Raymond v. Union Tex. Petroleum Corp., 697 F. Supp. 270, 271 (E.D. La. 1988) (relying
on Nunez v. Wainco Oil & Gas Co., 488 So. 2d 955 (La. 1986)).
173. Id. at 274.
174. Id.
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Later, in Mongrue v. Monsanto the Fifth Circuit affirmed a finding that
migrating wastewater that crosses property lines is not an unlawful
taking. 75 Although not raised on appeal, the plaintiffs also asserted at
trial that the injector had committed subsurface trespass.176 Regarding
this unraised issue, the Fifth Circuit seemed to accept the district court's
conclusion that "upon a proper showing of damages [for migration],
appellants may recover under a state unlawful trespass claim ...
regardless of the permit allowing for injection."177 Still later, the Fifth
Circuit affirmed the reasoning of Raymond, that migration of injected
wastewater is not per se "unlawful" if a valid regulatory permit authorizes
the action. 178
One of the most important waste disposal cases is Chance v. BP
Chemicals, Inc., a class action suit against BP Chemicals, alleging inter
alia subsurface trespass resulting from injecting waste fluids that migrated
across property lines.179 Relying on Willoughby Hills v. Corrigan,so the
court observed that:
[O]wnership rights in today's world are not as clear-cut as they were
before the advent of airplanes and injection wells.
Consequently, we do not accept appellants' assertion of absolute
ownership of everything below the surface of their properties. Just as
a property owner must accept some limitations on the ownership
rights extending above the surface of the property, we find that there
are also limitations on property owners' subsurface rights. We
therefore extend the reasoning of Willoughby Hills, that absolute
ownership of air rights is a doctrine which "has no place in the
modern world," to apply as well to ownership of subsurface rights.""t
The court concluded that the right to exclude others from the
subsurface extends only to invasions that "actually interfere with the
appellants' reasonable and foreseeable use of the subsurface."182 Thus,
landowners must suffer actual damages that affect their reasonable and
foreseeable use of the subsurface, not mere interference with title or
possession. The court expressly found that the trial court did not err in
refusing to allow the class to present evidence that "environmental stigma
associated with deep wells had a negative effect on appellants' property
values due to public perception that there may have been injectate under
175. Mongrue v. Monsanto, 249 F.3d 422 (5th Cir. 2001).
176. Id. at 432 n.17.
177. Id.
178. Boudreaux v. Jefferson Island Storage & Hub, LLC, 255 F.3d 271, 274 (5th Cir. 2001)
(construing Louisiana law).
179. Chance v. BP Chems., Inc., 670 N.E.2d 985, 986 (Ohio 1996).
180. 278 N.E.2d 658 (Ohio 1972).
181. Chance, 670 N.E.2d at 992.
182. Id.
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appellants' property and that the injectate may be dangerous."1 13 In other
words, a landowner may not recover damages for mere loss of speculative
value. Although the class claims were deemed too speculative, the court
did acknowledge that one class member might have a valid claim because
the subsurface migration of waste forced that class member to abandon
plans to drill for natural gas.' Thus, a mineral owner may have a valid
trespass claim when the injected waste migrates across property lines and
unreasonably interferes with access to recoverable minerals, such as oil
and gas-a showing of actual and substantial harm.
In Snyder Ranches, Inc. v. Oil Conservation Commission, the New
Mexico Supreme Court affirmed a decision of the conservation agency
that found a saltwater disposal operation would not result in saltwater
migration to a nearby tract. 185 However, the court stated in dicta:
The State of New Mexico may be said to have licensed the injection
of saltwater into the disposal well; however, such license does not
authorize trespass ... or other tortious conduct by the licensee, nor
does such license immunize the licensee from liability for negligence
or nuisance which flows from the licensed activity. ... In the event
that an actual trespass occurs by Mobil in its injection operation,
neither the Commission's decision, the district court's decision, nor
this opinion would in any way prevent Snyder Ranches from seeking
redress for such trespass.186
This dictum is disturbing in that it does not suggest that the plaintiff need
suffer any actual damages to obtain relief for such a trespass.
A few jurisdictions take an even more limited view of subsurface
trespass than the court in Chance, requiring that a subsurface trespasser
must know with "substantial certainty" that pollutants would migrate to
neighboring land. In OBG Technical Services, Inc. v. Northrop Grumman
Space & Mission Systems Corp.,187 the plaintiff suffered actual soil and
groundwater contamination from the actions of a subsurface trespasser
ironically named Best Friends.188 The court denied relief on the ground
that the plaintiff failed to prove Best Friends knew with "substantial
certainty" that pollutants on Best Friends' property were migrating onto
the plaintiff's property.189 The court noted:
183. Id. at 993.
184. Id. at 994 n.1.
185. 798 P.2d 587, 588 (N.M. 1990).
186. Id. at 590.
187. 503 F. Supp. 2d 490, 530 (D. Conn. 2007) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
158 (1965)).
18& Id. at 496-97.
189. Id. at 530. Cf Vill. of DePue, Ill. v. Viacom Int'l, Inc., 632 F. Supp. 2d 854, 865 (C.D. Ill.
2009) (holding that plaintiff must prove either negligent or intentional conduct resulting in an
invasion).
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In Connecticut, "the requisite intent to enter another's land may be
established if the act in question is done 'with knowledge that it will
to a substantial certainty result in the entry of the foreign matter."'
"In order to be liable for trespass, one must intentionally cause some
substance or thing to enter upon another's land." "Moreover, the
intention required to make the actor liable for trespass is an
intention to enter upon the particular piece of land in question....
An intrusion on the land of another as a result of negligence is not a
trespass."19
F. Subsurface Trespass Resulting From Enhanced Recovery Operations
Trespass issues arise when an operator injects a substance into the
subsurface of its own property for secondary or enhanced oil and gas
recovery, and that injected substance then invades the subsurface of
neighboring property. These cases are not as simple as waste disposal
cases because the focus of the plaintiff and the court is on the plaintiff's
loss of hydrocarbons through drainage resulting from the secondary or
enhanced recovery operations. Damages can arise when oil reserves on
the invaded property are displaced or when the invasion makes recovery
of reserves from the invaded property more difficult and expensive. Cases
addressing alleged subsurface trespass in the context of secondary and
enhanced recovery operations are mixed, but several cases suggest that
trespass claims are less likely to succeed if a regulatory agency has
authorized the particular operations.
In Railroad Commission of Texas v. Manziel, neighboring landowners
sought to set aside a conservation agency order approving a plan of
voluntary unitization for secondary oil recovery.191 The landowners were
particularly concerned about an exception location well that was to be
drilled near their tract.'" As grounds for setting aside the order, the
landowners claimed that injected water would inevitably invade their
property and result in a trespass that would water-out one of their oil
wells. 193
Although the landowners sought to set aside a regulatory order, the
court stated the issue as follows: "whether a trespass is committed when
secondary recovery waters from an authorized secondary recovery
project cross lease lines." 94 After discussing the value of secondary
recovery operations, the court concluded:
[I]f, in the valid exercise of its authority to prevent waste, protect
190. OBG Technical Servs., 503 F. Supp. 2d at 530 (citations omitted).
191. R.R. Comm'n v. Manziel, 361 S.W.2d 560, 561 (Tex. 1962).
192. Id.
193. Id. at 566-67.
194. Id. at 567.
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correlative rights, or in the exercise of other powers within its
jurisdiction, the Commission authorizes secondary recovery projects,
a trespass does not occur when the injected, secondary recovery
forces move across lease lines, and the operations are not subject to
an injunction on that basis. The technical rules of trespass have no
place in the consideration of the validity of the orders of the
Commission.195
In support of its conclusion, the court quoted Professors Howard
Williams and Charles Meyers:
What may be called a 'negative rule of capture' appears to be
developing. Just as under the rule of capture a landowner may
capture such oil or gas as will migrate from adjoining premises to a
well bottomed on his own land, so also may he inject into a
formation substances which may migrate through the structure to the
land of others, even if it thus results in the displacement under such
land of more valuable with less valuable substances[.] 196
Although the court stated the issue as whether a trespass had occurred,
the court also recognized that it was:
[N]ot confronted with the tort aspects of such practices. Neither is
the question raised as to whether the Commission's authorization of
such operations throws a protective cloak around the injecting
operator who might otherwise be subjected to the risks of liability for
actual damages to the adjoining property[.] 197
The court, however, discussed trespass in some detail and was
sympathetic to the view that traditional trespass rules may not be
appropriate regarding subsurface invasions that relate to secondary
recovery-an apparent important societal need. 198 But the court's
discussion suggests that a regulatory order, issued in the public interest, is
necessary if traditional trespass rules are to be avoided.199 The need for a
regulatory permit is now questionable in light of Garza, where the
defendant had a drilling permit but not a permit to hydraulically fracture
because the conservation agency did not require one.29 Nevertheless, in
circumstances regarding invasive subsurface injections of a continuing
nature, in contrast with hydraulic fracturing, which is a short-term well
completion technique, a regulatory permit would be helpful, perhaps
even necessary, to the avoidance of an actionable subsurface trespass. As
195. Id. at 568-69 (emphasis added).
196. Id. at 568 (quoting HOWARD WILLIAMS & CHARLES MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW §
204.5 (1995)).
197. Id. at 566.
198. Id. at 568.
199. See id.
200. Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v. Garza Energy Trust, 268 S.W.3d 1, 15 (Tex. 2008).
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a practical matter, the need for a permit to avoid a subsurface trespass
action for continuing injections is not particularly troublesome as
regulation of such an activity seems almost certain.
In Crawford v. Hrabe, the Kansas Supreme Court found no actionable
trespass when a permittee injected water for secondary recovery.201 Here,
the lessee brought wastewater onto the leased premises and injected it
into the lessors' subsurface. 202 The plaintiffs claimed that their interests
would be injured by the migration of this water throughout their
subsurface. 20 3 The court surveyed other jurisdictions' treatment of
subsurface trespass of wastewater, finding that the orthodox rules applied
to surface trespasses do not usually apply to subsurface trespass and that,
when water is injected to increase production on the lessors' land, no
actionable trespass occurs.204 The court found that injecting wastewater
for secondary recovery operations was a practical and efficient use of a
potentially hazardous waste product.2 05
In Tide Water Associated Oil Co. v. Stott, lessors were denied damages
for the displacement of wet gas with dry gas resulting from recycling
operations in the field where the lessors refused the opportunity to
include their leases in the operations. 206 In Syverson v. North Dakota
Industrial Commission, the court upheld a regulatory order authorizing
secondary recovery operations over the objection of a small number of
lessors within the field where the record indicated that they were given a
fair opportunity to join in operations but refused to do so. 2 07 The court
noted that the unit operations were designed to increase ultimate
recovery from the reservoir and that the lessors had not shown that they
would suffer any actual harm as a result of such operations. 208
On the other hand, in Cassinos v. Union Oil Co. of California a
California appellate court found that wastewater injected into a
petroleum reservoir did cause actual damage to production operations on
neighboring land. 209 The court found this to be an actionable trespass
against the neighboring mineral estate. 210 In reaching this decision, the
201. Crawford v. Hrabe, 44 P.3d 442, 443 (Kan. 2002).
202. Id. at 444.
203. Id. at 444, 447.
204. Id. at 448-50 (citing Holt v. Sw. Antioch Sand Unit, Fifth Enlarged, 292 P.2d 998 (Okla.
1955); R.R. Comm'n v. Manziel, 361 S.W.2d 560, 568 (Tex. 1962); Geo Viking, Inc. v. Tex-Lee
Operating Co., 817 S.W.2d 357 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1991, writ denied)).
205. Id. at 453.
206. Tide Water Associated Oil Co. v. Stott, 159 F.2d 174, 179 (5th Cir. 1947) (construing
Texas law). See also Cal. Co. v. Britt, 154 So. 2d 144, 150-51 (Miss. 1963) (barring damages to
unleased mineral owners who refused to join in a voluntary unitization operation on grounds
that any drainage suffered was governed by the rule of capture).
207. Syverson v. N.D. Indus. Comm'n, 111 N.W.2d 128, 133-34 (N.D. 1961).
20& Id. at 132.
209. Cassinos v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 574, 579-80 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993).
210. Id. at 577.
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court cited three Oklahoma cases, one of which was found to be
analogous because saltwater injection operations had caused actual
damages to nearby wells. 211 The court distinguished the other two cases
because, in those cases, the courts found the injection operations caused
no actual damages. 212
Oklahoma recognizes a cause of action for private nuisance when
injected water injures another's interest in a well or leasehold, even
though the water was injected for enhanced oil recovery pursuant to a
regulatory permit.213 However, the requirement of showing actual injury
or recoverable damages remains. 2 14 Regarding the disposal of saltwater
produced from petroleum wells, the court recognized that "[i]f such
disposal of saltwater is forbidden unless oil producers first obtain the
consent of all persons under whose lands it may migrate or percolate,
[then] underground disposal would be practically prohibited." 2 15
In Tidewater Oil Co. v. Jackson, the court held that the injection of
wastewater for secondary recovery constituted an actionable trespass
where the injected water flooded the neighboring plaintiff's oil wellbores
even though the operator held a regulatory permit authorizing the
operations. 2 16 The court reasoned:
[T]hough a water flood project in Kansas be carried on under color
of public law, as a legalized nuisance or trespass, the water flooder
may not conduct operations in a manner to cause substantial injury
to the property of a non-assenting lessee-producer in the common
reservoir, without incurring the risk of liability therefor. 217
To establish liability, "[i]t is sufficient that the water flooding activities
were intentional and the consequences foreseeable. They were
actionable, even though lawfully carried on, if they caused substantial
injury to the claimants." 2 18 Nevertheless, because the activity was lawful
under a conservation agency order, the court reversed an award of
211. Id. at 580. The analogous case is West Edmond Lime Unit v. Lillard, 265 P.2d 730, 731-
32 (Okla. 1954).
212. Cassinos, 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 580 (distinguishing West Edmond Salt Water Disposal
Ass'n v. Rosecrans, 226 P.2d 965, 968-69 (Okla. 1950) (finding no actual harm); Sunray Oil Co.
v. Cortez Oil Co., 112 P.2d 792, 793-95 (Okla. 1941) (finding no probability of any actual harm)).
213. Greyhound Leasing & Fin. Corp. v. Joiner City Unit, 444 F.2d 439, 444-45 (10th Cir.
1971) (construing Oklahoma law); Boyce v. Dundee Healdton Sand Unit, 560 P.2d 234, 238
(Okla. Civ. App. 1975).
214. See West Edmond Salt Water Disposal Ass'n, 226 P.2d at 970 (Okla. 1950) (finding
owner of adjacent tract had no cause of action for trespass where defendant injected saltwater
into stratum already containing saltwater because no actual damages were suffered). But see
West Edmond Lime Unit, 265 P.2d at 732 (Okla. 1954) (allowing cause of action where injected
saltwater had migrated beneath neighboring land, harming ongoing petroleum operations).
215. West Edmond Salt Water Disposal Ass'n, 226 P.2d at 969.
216. Tidewater Oil Co. v. Jackson, 320 F.2d 157, 163-64 (10th Cir. 1963) (construing Kansas
law).
217. Id. at 163.
21& Id. at 164.
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punitive damages. 2 19 Similarly, in Hartman v. Texaco Inc. the New
Mexico Court of Appeals held that an oil and gas operator who suffered
actual damages from a waterflooding operation conducted on
neighboring lands had a cause of action for trespass.220
Interestingly, the ALI actually cites Hartman in its Appendix to
Restatement Section 159.221 Because Hartman involved facts where the
jury had already determined that actual damages could be attributed to
the waterflooding operations, it supports the current trend that courts are
taking regarding harmful subsurface trespasses. However, because the
court rejected the plaintiff's claim for statutory recovery of double
(punitive) damages, concluding that the statute did not apply in the case
of a deep subsurface trespass,222 Hartman also supports the notion that
the Restatement and common law views were intended to protect against
subsurface and aerial trespasses that occur within the useable reaches of
the surface.223 Accordingly, in the case of harmless deep subsurface
trespasses, Hartman does not conflict with my proposed revisions to the
Restatement.
Three cases arising in Arkansas have reached somewhat divergent
views on waterflooding operations. In Budd v. Ethyl Corp., the plaintiff
sought damages for loss of brine resulting from waterflooding operations
on two separate tracts of land. 22 4 The first tract was on the edge of the
waterflooding operation. 225 The plaintiff held an oil and gas lease for a
fractional interest in the second tract, which was within the circle of
defendant's injection wells. 226 Regarding the edge tract, the court found
that the defendant was protected by the rule of capture. 227 Regarding the
second tract, the court found that, as an oil and gas lessee, the plaintiff
held only an inchoate right to drill for minerals and no right to minerals
in place. 228 Moreover, the court noted that the record failed to indicate
whether the plaintiff had volunteered to participate in the waterflooding
effort. 229 Accordingly, the court declined to award plaintiff damages for
net profits. 23 0 Thus, the claim was not really grounded in trespass but was
rather a claim by a co-tenant for net profits.
219. Id. at 165.
220. Hartman v. Texaco Inc., 937 P.2d 979,984 (N.M. Ct. App. 1997).
221. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §159 (1965).
222. Hartman, 937 P.2d at 981-82 (construing N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-14-1.1 (1994)).
223. Id. at 982 (discussing the legislative intent of the statute at issue to protect against more
limited instances of trespass).
224. Budd v. Ethyl Corp., 474 S.W.2d 411, 412-13 (Ark. 1971).
225. Id. at 412.
226. Id. at 413.
227. Id. at 412-13.
228. Id. at 413.
229. Id. at 414.
230. Id.
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In a later federal decision, Young v. Ethyl Corp., the court found that a
claim of trespass will lie when a mineral owner seeks damages in a
circumstance where the subject tract is within the circle of injection
wells. 23 1 This analysis was adopted by the Arkansas Supreme Court in
Jameson v. Ethyl Corp. when the plaintiff was a fee mineral owner, but
the court nevertheless allowed the waterflooding operations to continue
on public policy grounds. 232 The court stated:
[W]e are unwilling to extend the rule of capture further. By adopting
an interpretation that the rule of capture should not be extended
insofar as operations relate to lands lying within the peripheral area
affected, we, however, are holding that reasonable and necessary
secondary recovery processes of pools of transient materials should
be permitted, when such operations are carried out in good faith for
the purpose of maximizing recovery from a common pool. The
permitting of this good faith recovery process is conditioned,
however, by imposing an obligation on the extracting party to
compensate the owner of the depleted lands for the minerals
extracted in excess of natural depletion, if any, at the time of taking
and for any special damages which may have been caused to the
depleted property. 233
This stated measure of damages is unclear, but it appears to require
the waterflooding party to account for production drained from the
plaintiff's property that is attributable to the enhanced recovery
operations. Presumably this would be for net profits. The court did not
elaborate on how such damages should be determined or which party
should carry the burden of proof, but presumably such burden would rest
with the plaintiff.
In Baumgartner v. Gulf Oil Corp., the Nebraska Supreme Court held
that when a regulatory agency approved a plan of unitization and when
the plaintiff had rejected a fair and reasonable offer to participate in the
plan, no trespass results from water-flooding. 234 However, the court did
indicate that the plaintiff may be entitled to recover any profits that he
could prove would have been realized through continued primary
recovery operations unfettered by the neighboring unitized operations in
which he had declined to participate. 23 5 Note the difference in the
measure of damages in this case from the measure articulated by the
Arkansas Supreme Court in Jameson v. Ethyl Corp.236 In Nebraska, a
plaintiff may recover damages for profits that would be derived from his
231. Young v. Ethyl Corp., 521 F.2d 771, 774 (8th Cir. 1975) (construing Arkansas law).
232. Jameson v. Ethyl Corp., 609 S.W.2d 346, 351 (Ark. 1980).
233. Id.
234. Baumgartner v. Gulf Oil Corp., 168 N.W.2d 510, 516 (Neb. 1969).
235. Id. at 519.
236. Jameson, 609 S.W.2d at 351 (Ark. 1980).
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own primary recovery operations. In Arkansas, a plaintiff appears to be
able to recover damages for the amount of production drained from her
land by neighboring secondary or enhanced recovery operations in
excess of what would have been drained by primary recovery operations.
While allowing damages in situations where the plaintiff declines a fair
opportunity to participate in unitized secondary or enhanced recovery
operations is undesirable, the Nebraska approach is somewhat better
because the plaintiff would seem to carry a difficult burden of proof-at
least as a practical matter.
Of these cases, the ALI should be most persuaded by Manziel, which
cites the rule of capture to deny liability, and Crawford, which recognized
the importance of not allowing trespass law to inhibit the use of
secondary and enhanced recovery operations. If a regulatory permit is
issued, if a fair and reasonable offer is rejected, and if no actual damage
other than drainage occurs, then the operator should be shielded from
liability under the rule of capture. It is unnecessary to extend these
prerequisites to hydraulic fracturing, however, because it is a well
completion technique designed to facilitate and maximize primary
recovery from a single well and unit, and the operation is neither ongoing
nor a secondary or enhanced recovery technique. 23 7
G. Subsurface Trespass Resulting From the Subsurface Storage of Natural
Gas
Natural gas is frequently injected into the subsurface for temporary
storage. If such gas migrates beneath neighboring lands, then trespass
issues arise, but the focus of most cases is on the ownership of the
migrated gas, not the trespass itself. Moreover, in most jurisdictions,
pipeline companies and gas utilities have established and operated gas
storage reservoirs, and they have and often exercise the right of eminent
domain -usually acquiring rights to the entire reservoir.
One of the earliest cases to consider trespass in the context of
underground natural gas storage was the Kentucky case, Hammonds v.
Central Kentucky Natural Gas Co. 238 In its highly criticized ruling,23 9 the
court foolishly reasoned that natural gas injected for storage was really
released back to nature-in essence, abandoned. 2 0 Because the gas was
abandoned, it had no owner and was once again subject to the rule of
237. Cf. Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v. Garza Energy Trust, 268 S.W.3d 1, 14-17 (Tex. 2008).
238. Hammonds v. Cent. Ky. Natural Gas Co., 75 S.W.2d 204 (Ky. Ct. App. 1934), partially
overruled by Tex. Am. Energy Corp. v. Citizens Fidelity Bank & Trust, 736 S.W.2d 25, 28 (Ky.
1987).
239. William Jarrel Smith, Rights and Liabilities on Subsurface Operations, 8 INST. ON OIL &
GAS L. & TAX'N 1, 25-6 (1957).
240. Hammonds, 75 S.W.2d at 205-06.
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capture.241 Comparing injected gas to the release of captured wild
animals, the court found that no trespass occurred when the released gas
migrated to neighboring property because the injecting party no longer
held title to the gas. 242 In Kansas, the reasoning of Hammonds has been
followed "where a natural gas utility was not involved, where no
certificate authorizing an underground natural gas storage facility had
been issued by the Kansas Corporation Commission, and where a
landowner had used the property of an adjoining landowner for gas
storage without authorization or consent." 243
In Oklahoma Natural Gas Co. v. Mahan & Rowsey, Inc., the court
implicitly concluded that the injector retains title to injected gas that
migrated to other lands.24 However, evidence showed that the gas was
confined to an identifiable and well-defined formation and that the gas
was distinguishable, due to helium content and lack of certain organic
compounds, from native gas in the area.2 45 Under Oklahoma statutory
law, a public utility may acquire underground gas storage rights by
condemnation. 246
Texas wisely rejected the reasoning of Hammonds in Lone Star Gas
Co. v. Murchison, finding that injected natural gas is not abandoned but
remains the personal property of the injecting party, and as such is no
longer subject to capture by neighboring landowners even if the gas
migrates beneath neighboring tracts.247 Of course, since the injector still
owns the injected gas, the question of trespass arises. In Murchison, the
241. Id.
242. Id. at 206.
243. Union Gas Sys., Inc. v. Carnahan, 774 P.2d 962, 967 (Kan. 1989). See also Anderson v.
Beech Aircraft Corp., 699 P.2d 1023, 1032 (Kan. 1985). These cases were distinguished in Reese
Exploration, Inc. v. Williams Natural Gas Co., 983 F.2d 1514, 1523 (10th Cir. 1993) (construing
Kansas law). Parties having the power of eminent domain may protect their rights by securing a
state certificate and by condemning the reservoir, and such parties are further protected from
the rule of capture if they can prove by a preponderance of the evidence that injected gas had
migrated to adjoining property or to a stratum that has not been condemned. KAN. STAT. ANN. §
55-1210 (West 2007). See also Williams Natural Gas Co. v. Supra Energy, Inc., 931 P.2d 7 (Kan.
1997); Union Gas, 774 P.2d at 967. For the meaning of "adjoining," see N. Natural Gas Co. v.
Nash Oil & Gas, Inc., 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10181, at *7 (D. Kan. May 16, 2005). If gas migrates
into another stratum, further condemnation may be pursued, but landowners' damages for the
pre-condemnation trespass and unjust enrichment are measured by the fair rental value of such
stratum. See, e.g., Beck v. N. Natural Gas Co., 170 F.3d 1018 (10th Cir. 1999) (construing Kansas
law).
244. Oklahoma Natural Gas Co. v. Mahan & Rowsey, Inc., 786 F.2d 1004, 1006-07 (10th Cir.
1986) (construing Oklahoma law).
245. Id. at 1007.
246. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, § 36.3 (West 2000). Under this statutory law, injected gas
remains the property of the injector, even if the gas migrates beneath other lands, provided that
the injector can prove migration and also that the injector compensates the owner of the invaded
stratum. Id. § 36.6.
247. Lone Star Gas Co. v. Murchison, 353 S.W.2d 870, 879-80 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1962,
writ ref'd n.r.e.). See also, Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Zuckerman, 234 Cal. Rptr. 630, 633 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1987); Humble Oil & Ref. v. West, 508 S.W.2d 812, 817 (Tex. 1974); White v. N.Y. State
Nat. Gas Corp., 190 F. Supp. 342, 347-48 (W.D. Pa. 1960).
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storage company had acquired the right to store natural gas in what was
thought to be a well-defined subsurface reservoir, but the gas actually
migrated beyond the assumed reservoir limits to a neighboring subsurface
property. 248 Because the storage company retained title to migrated gas
as personal property, the court concluded the gas was not subject to the
rule of capture. 24 9 This ruling aligns with surface migration of oil that
migrates to neighboring properties after spills or leaks.25 0 Neither
Murchison nor any other Texas case squarely addresses the trespass
question, and no case addresses injunctive relief for what is a continuing
trespass. 251 This dearth of authority implicitly supports my argument that
the Restatement should require actual and substantial subsurface
damages for a trespass action to lie in these circumstances. However, the
dearth of case authority may also be due to the fact that gas storage
reservoirs may be acquired by eminent domain, 252 and trespass
allegations are often treated as an action in inverse condemnation. 253
In ANR Pipeline Co. v. 60 Acres of Land a federal court in Michigan,
in dicta, stated that "if injected gas moves across boundaries there may be
a trespass." 254 However, the court held that migration of non-native gas
to a neighboring property does not give rise to a claim of inverse
condemnation. 255
Few reported cases address actual damages resulting from stored gas
that migrates to the subsurface of nearby property. The Kansas Supreme
Court has rendered three decisions concerning personal injury and
property damage arising when stored gas migrated from an underground
storage reservoir and eventually vented at the surface in downtown
Hutchinson, Kansas. 256 The leak culminated in a massive explosion of
natural gas in the heart of the city, killing several people and destroying
several businesses. 257 The first opinion dealt with an award of negligence
24& Murchison, 353 S.W.2d at 872-73.
249. Id. at 880.
250. See, e.g., Champlin Exploration, Inc. v. W. Bridge & Steel Co., Inc., 597 P.2d 1215, 1218
(Okla. 1979).
251. In Murchison, the court observed:
Appellees expend a great deal of space in their brief to the argument that appellant has
trespassed upon their property. The status of this record is such, however, that we must, as
Ulysses 'lash ourselves to the mast and resist Siren's songs' of trespass, or similar contention.
This, for the simple reason that no action seeking redress or claimed trespass is here presented.
353 S.W.2d at 875.
252 See, e.g., TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 91.181 (West 2001); Zuckerman, 234 Cal. Rptr.
at 637; Iroquois Gas Corp. v. Gernatt, 281 N.Y.S.2d 896, 897 (N.Y. App. Div. 1967).
253. See, e.g., Columbia Gas Transmission Corp. v. An Exclusive Nat. Gas Storage
Easement, 747 F. Supp. 401, 403 (N.D. Ohio 1990).
254. ANR Pipeline Co. v. 60 Acres of Land, 418 F. Supp. 2d 933, 940 (W.D. Mich. 2006).
255. Id. at 941.
256. See Gilley v. Kan. Gas Serv. Co., 169 P.3d 1064, 1065 (Kan. 2007); Smith v. Kan. Gas
Serv. Co., 169 P.3d 1052, 1054 (Kan. 2007); Hayes Sight & Sound, Inc. v. ONEOK, Inc., 136 P.3d
428, 433-34 (Kan. 2006).
257. Hayes Sight & Sound, Inc., 136 P.3d at 433-34.
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and punitive damages for losses suffered by a particular business.28 The
last two opinions dealt with unsuccessful class action suits.29
Significantly, in one of these class actions, the court denied recovery of
damages for "diminution in the property's market value caused by the
stigma or market fear resulting from an accidental contamination where
the property owner has not proved either a physical injury to the
property or an interference with the owner's use and enjoyment." 260
In one case involving the subsurface storage of freshwater, Board of
County Commissioners v. Park County Sportsmen's Ranch, LLP, the
Colorado Supreme Court held that storing freshwater in an aquifer does
not constitute a trespass against neighboring landowners where there was
no physical invasion of neighboring lands by directional drilling or
occupancy by recharge structures or extraction wells. 26 1 In addition, the
court concluded that this use of an aquifer does not require the user to
acquire storage rights by eminent domain or require the payment of
compensation.2 62 Because this is a water case arising in Colorado, it does
not directly support my suggested revisions to the Restatement regarding
general subsurface use. As the court observed: "[B]y reason of
Colorado's constitution, statutes, and case precedent, neither surface
water, nor ground water, nor the use rights thereto, nor the water-bearing
capacity of natural formations belong to a landowner as a stick in the
property rights bundle." 263 Nevertheless, the holding is consistent with
the underlying rationale of my suggested revisions.
V. CONCLUSION
The ALI's purpose in creating the Restatement was to guide lawyers
and judges as to the present state of the law. However, the law has
changed while the Restatement has not. If traditional surface trespass law
is applied to the deep subsurface, numerous subsurface uses could be
greatly hindered, if not rendered entirely impracticable. By adhering to
its rigid formulation of the law of trespass, various uses are in limbo, if
not in jeopardy: the injection of substances for enhanced recovery of oil,
gas, brine, and other native fluids; the injection of fluids and proppants in
the course of hydraulic fracturing of tight oil and gas reservoirs; the
underground injection of natural gas for storage; the underground
injection of wastes for disposal, including saltwater disposal relating to
hydrocarbon exploitation; underground geologic carbon sequestration to
258. Id. at 433.
259. Gilley, 169 P.3d at 1065; Smith, 169 P.3d at 1054.
260. Smith, 169 P.3d at 1059.
261. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs v. Park Cnty. Sportsmen's Ranch, LLP, 45 P.3d 693, 710 (Colo.
2002).
262. Id. at 715.
263. Id. at 707.
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decrease the emission of greenhouse gases into the atmosphere; and the
gathering of subsurface information through various kinds of exploration
activities, particularly conventional and 3-D seismic surveys and aerial
magnetic surveys. Although each of these activities, excluding seismic and
aerial surveys, can lead to the physical migration of substances beneath
neighboring property, they should not give rise to actionable trespass
without a showing of actual and substantial harm other than drainage.
Considering deep subsurface invasions in a manner similar to aerial
trespasses provides the ALI with the appropriate means to protect these
productive uses of the subsurface estate without drastically revising its
current text.
By considering my suggested revisions, the ALI could bring full circle
the law of trespass that already recognizes the advent of the airplane but
which fails to recognize the technologic advancement in the use of the
deep subsurface. The subsurface invasions listed above meet important
societal needs, which must be commercial (economically efficient) if they
are to succeed. A strict application of trespass law to the subsurface,
particularly the ability to enjoin a continuing trespass, could in some,
perhaps many, instances make the difference between economic and
uneconomic enterprises. But above all, applying surface trespass law to
harmless deep subsurface invasions is outdated and inconsistent with
jurisdictional trends.
With the exceptions already noted in this article, the Restatement no
longer reflects the clear trend of case law, but lags behind it. Deep
subsurface trespass claims, unless the plaintiff shows substantial and
actual damage, are rarely considered actionable. In the wake of the
jurisprudential trends, the ALI should consider whether its current
formulation of the law of trespass accurately presents the current state of
the law.
240 [Vol. 6
